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Intuitionism is the theory that our moral
intuitions are mostly correct; this is to say
that the majority of our moral beliefs that
are founded on our moral intuitions
accurately capture genuine moral truths
about the world. In Intuitionism, David
Kaspar advocates a stronger theory of
intuitionism, according to which our
intuitions are always correct; he argues
that each of knows what the right thing to
do even if we don't believe that we do.

Kaspar assumes that strong
intuitionism is true and asks what a
completed intuitionist theory would look
like. He believes that science can serve as
a model for philosophers. One popular
criticism of philosophy in general, and
moral philosophy in particular, is that it
contemporary philosophers are no closer to
discovering truth than those who came
centuries before. In contrast, Kaspar
contends, science builds upon scientific
discoveries and thinkers of the past. There
is a general consensus that contemporary
scientific theories are closer to getting it
right about the world than those that came
before it. To support this claim, Kaspar
cites how in physics Newton's laws are said
to cover macroscopic objects, Einstein's
laws gravity, Bohr's laws quantum events,
so forth and so on. A completed
intuitionist theory, he contends, will follow
science's lead, and incorporate the
strengths of various intuitionist and ethicist
theories; he then provides a laundry list of
disparate normative theories that he
believes would be part of a completed
intuitionist theory of ethics.
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Roughly, Kaspar is suggesting that the complete intuitionist theory is one
that is comprised of the most appealing aspects of normative theories from the
past. This approach is not necessarily as ad hoc as it may appear, though, as most
moral philosophers treat moral intuitions as playing a privileged role in their
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6926&cn=394
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moral philosophers treat moral intuitions as playing a privileged role in their
theory, counting consistency with moral intuitions as evidence of their theory's
worth. Because intuitionism asserts that our moral intuitions give us moral
knowledge, any elements of a normative theory that are said to be consistent with
our moral intuitions are candidates for a complete intuitionist theory of ethics.
However, there are two substantive aspects of Kaspar's approach that undermine
his efforts.

First, it appears as if Kaspar's appeal to great thinkers in ethics is
inconsistent. For example, he rejects the idea of an overarching supreme moral
principle that is capable of determining what the right thing to do in any given
situation. However, many prominent normative ethicists have the intuition that,
there are a finite number of moral laws  often times a single supreme moral
principle that would be capable of telling us how to act in any given situation.
Furthermore, ethicists have good reasons to believe this intuition is correct; two
reasons stand out: (1) a supreme moral principle is more ontologically
parsimonious than multiple principles, and far more parsimonious (and practical)
than an infinite number of moral principles, and (2) ethics is understood as the
branch of philosophy concerned with answering the question "What is the right thing
to do?" for any given situation. A supreme moral principle would be one that could
answer this question for any situation we might face ourselves in. To know the
supreme principle, then, is to know what the right thing to do is no matter what
situation you find yourself in. By dismissing our intuitions about a supreme moral
principle, Kaspar rejects the fundamental tenant of his strong intuitionism  that our
intuitions capture moral truth.

Second Kaspar seems confused about the relationship between the laws of
physics; Newton's laws of motion are theories about the world as a whole, not
merely the macroscopic objects. The problem is that these laws are demonstrably
false when we apply them to the subatomic level. Given that humans primarily
interact with macroscopic objects, Newton's laws are instrumentally valuable tools,
but they fail to capture genuine laws of nature. We don't know the laws of nature.
Indeed, Scientists have long looked for a unifying scientific theory that explained all
physical phenomena at all levels with the accuracy that Newton's, Bohr's, and
Einstein's describe crude subsections of nature; such a theory would be a complete
theory about the laws of nature.

Kaspar's goal is to construct a complete intuitionist theory, which if true
would capture the actual moral law or laws that govern our world; but he treats
contemporary science as a model for constructing such a theory despite the fact
that contemporary scientific theories, like Newton's laws, are generally accepted to
do just about everything but capture the actual natural laws that govern our world.

Kaspar's discussion of intuitionism is, at times, compelling, but unfortunately
there is a substantial oversight that undermines his effort: This book is missing a
thorough discussion of knowledge. The central thesis of strong intuitionism is that
each of us knows what the right thing to do is  even if we don't know that we
know. Unfortunately the author devotes less than a page (52) to the topic,
asserting that knowledge is merely justified true belief. However it is generally
accepted by epistemologists, or knowledge theorists, that Gettiercases, named for
a case presented by Edmund Gettier, constitute counterexamples to this otherwise
commonsense theory of knowledge. In the traditional Gettier case, an agent comes
to have a true belief that they are justified in having, but their justification is a red
herring that has no relationship to the truthmaking aspect of the belief. It is
generally accepted that in these cases, agents lack knowledge despite having
justified, true beliefs. In the same way that there is substantive disagreement
between moral philosophers, there is substantive disagreement between
epistemologists on what constitutes knowledge.

Many epistemologists agree that although the definition of knowledge as
justified true belief is false, it is probably close enough to describe most of the
scenarios we deal with in our everyday lives; of course the same can be said for
Newton's laws, although they don't capture true natural laws, most of us will get
along just swell by applying Newton's laws as if they were true. But just as the
amalgam of Newton's laws, Bohr's laws, and Einstein's laws don't capture the
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=6926&cn=394
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amalgam of Newton's laws, Bohr's laws, and Einstein's laws don't capture the
natural laws, we have no reason to think the amalgam of moral theories Kaspar
strings together captures the moral laws that govern the actual world.
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